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FOREWORD
The possibility of achieving decisive results from short warning attacks
appears to have improved greatly with technological advances. Indeed,
strategic surprise offers both golden opportunities and lethal dangers, so it
attracts much attention in today’s world.
In this monograph, Dr. Colin Gray takes a broad view of strategic
surprise, and relates it to the current military transformation. He argues
that the kind of strategic surprise to which the United States is most at
risk and which is most damaging to our national security is the deep and
pervasive connection between war and politics. Although America is
usually superior at making war, it is far less superior in making peace out
of war. Dr. Gray concludes that the current military transformation shows
no plausible promise of helping to correct the long-standing U.S. weakness
in the proper use of forces as an instrument of policy.
This monograph was written under the Strategic Studies Institute’s
External Research Associates Program (ERAP). It is intended to stimulate
debate on the role of policy in the exercise of war.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Though discounted by Clausewitz in the circumstances of his era,
strategic surprise has enjoyed considerable popularity over the past
century. The possibility of achieving decisive results from attacks launched
on short, or zero, warning has appeared to improve greatly with advances
in technology. It follows that surprise has been recognized as offering
what seem to be both golden opportunities and lethal dangers. Since
surprise is an ironbound necessity for the tactical success of terrorism, it
is understandable that it attracts a major degree of attention today. There
is no real novelty about this. After all, for 40 years the United States and
its North Atlantic Treaty Organizatiion (NATO) allies perpetually worried
about surprise attack on the Central Front in Europe, as well as about a
surprise ﬁrst strike designed to disarm the United States of its ability to
retaliate with its strategic nuclear forces.
As a general rule, this monograph does not repeat or attempt to second
guess the existing scholarship on how to correct bureaucratic and other
pathologies in the world of intelligence. Furthermore, it does not contest
the declared purposes or the details of the Army’s radical transformation
plan, both of which it judges to be admirable. It is not that kind of analysis.
Instead, this discussion takes an unusually broad view of the problem,
actually the condition, of strategic surprise, and relates it to the process
of military transformation that currently is still in its early stages. The
analysis has a strong thesis and conclusion. Speciﬁcally, it argues that in
period after period, and with few exceptions in war after war, the kind
of strategic surprise to which the United States is most at risk, and which
is most damaging to U.S. national security, is the unexpected depth and
pervasiveness of the connection between war and politics. Americans
usually are superior in making war: they are far less superior in making
the peace that they want out of the war that they wage.
The monograph argues that the current military transformation, though
certainly welcome, cannot itself correct the long-standing U.S. weakness in
the proper use of force as an instrument of policy. The discussion claims
that, notwithstanding its probable virtues in the enhancement of military
prowess, the current military transformation bids fair to be irrelevant to
America’s really serious strategic problem or condition. What the global
superpower needs is a military establishment that it can use in ways
conducive to the standards of international order it seeks to uphold, and
with the political consequences that U.S. policy intends. Whether that
establishment is more, or less, network-centric, or has, more or less, on-call
precision ﬁrepower, truly is a matter of less than overwhelming importance.
v

Politics rules! More accurately phrased, perhaps, policy should rule! War is
political behavior that must serve policy. Since the conduct of war should
not be a self-regarding apolitical activity, preparation for it in peacetime,
as well as its exercise in anger, needs to be suffused with the sense of
purpose that is provided only by the realm of policy. To summarize: this
monograph has taken no issue with the grand design of the transforming
Army, rather the salient topics are the use made of the Army by American
policymakers, and the way that the Army chooses to behave, both in
combat and afterwards.
The argument unfolds cumulatively with seven points presented in all
but self-explanatory, descriptive language.
Bureaucratic Reform.
1. Reorganization of intelligence bureaucracies can be useful, but is only of
marginal importance for reduction in the risks of strategic surprise.
There is always room for bureaucratic improvement. But every
reorganization for reform brings its own pathologies. If we are looking for
areas of behavior wherein truly signiﬁcant improvement can be made in
meeting the challenge of potential strategic surprise, bureaucratic reform
is not among them. Of course, there are administrative reforms that do
make a difference; for example, those that affect career and promotion
patterns, and hence shape the trafﬁc ﬂow of high talent. However, defense
against the kind of strategic surprise to which the United States is most
vulnerable, the unexpected political consequences of military behavior, is
best provided by strategic education, not reorganization.
Understanding the Condition.
2. Surprise effect, not surprise, is the challenge.
The problem is not surprise. Surprise happens!—to adapt the common
exclamation. Rather the problem is the effects of surprise. Surprise, by
deﬁnition, is in the hands of our enemies who are attempting to paralyse
the dialectic of war. But the effects of surprise, by and large, are in our
hands. We cannot aspire to be surprise-proof. We can, however, aim to be
proofed against many, perhaps most, of the malign effects of surprise.
3. Some unpleasant surprises should be readily avoidable.
War and warfare tend to be confused one with the other. The fact
that there is much more to war than the waging of warfare is the core of
the American difﬁculty in using its military power for desired political
vi

outcomes. Better understanding of the connection between war and peace,
and between the waging of warfare and the kind of postwar settlement
intended, would hugely reduce the incidence and severity of unpleasant
strategic surprise for U.S. statecraft. The relationship between policy
and military action inherently is a tense one. They are distinctive realms,
commanded technically by different rules and values. Nonetheless,
the conduct of warfare must be guided by policy, though policy must
be prepared to be disciplined by military practicalities. Poverty in the
necessary dialogue between policy and the military helps produce, indeed
all but guarantees, adverse strategic surprise.
Levels of Analysis.
4. The geopolitical context is the most important.
Strategic surprise is the product, ultimately, of a particular geopolitical
context. Technological surprise is improbable, though the use of
internationally common technologies in surprising ways is a near certainty.
Diverse strategic and military cultures, reﬂecting their unique geopolitical
circumstances, will adapt new technologies and ideas to ﬁt their distinctive
needs. The threat or use of force is a political act deriving from a political,
or geopolitical, context. At root, such threat or use is not a technological or
cultural action. Strategic surprise may well have a technological dimension,
but it will not be the product, or the expression, of technology. By way
of contrast, such surprise is certain to have a cultural dimension, in the
sense that culture must contribute to the making and the content of policy.
Statecraft, and war as one of its agents, are political behaviors, conducted
for policy ends. No matter how prominent the technological or cultural
factors appear to be, the behaviors are political. They are intended to have
geopolitical effect.
Conclusions: Implications for the Army.
5. Do not exaggerate the dangers from surprise.
Surprise, even strategic surprise, is not a panacea solution to the
uncertainties of war, or the strengths of the enemy. History records few
cases where decisive victory was achieved as a result of the achievement
of successful strategic surprise. Even when surprise is secured, so what?
What are its strategic beneﬁts, its effects? If we are alert and ﬂexibly
adaptive, we should be able to ensure that no enemy who catches us by
strategic surprise would proﬁt by the deed. That said, it is possible that
the unprecedentedly interconnected world of the 21st century is, as a
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consequence, unprecendentedly vulnerable to the ripple effect of strategic
surprise. What once were local events now can have a global resonance. We
are respectful of this view, but not thoroughly persuaded that it accurately
expresses a historical change of great moment for our argument.
6. Minimum regrets must be a guiding principle.
Defense planners cannot aspire to design and procure the uniquely
“right” force posture for the future. They can and should, however, aim
to get the really Big Things right enough. The most suitable blessing for a
defense planner is, “may all your errors be small ones.” In transforming the
Army for the 21st century, the appropriate ambition is to design a posture
that will never be the cause of major regrets for “might and should have
beens.” The Army’s transformation plan, privileging ﬂexibility and agility,
should minimize the danger of being caught on the wrong side of truly
major decisions.
7. The operational level of warfare is not the whole of war. Is the U.S. Army
pursuing the most appropriate vision in its transformation?
The transformation needed most urgently in the Army is in its
suitability as the primary policy instrument of the sheriff of world order.
The transformation now underway in all of the Armed Forces, including
the Army, necessarily has as a prominent feature, the further leveraging
of information technology (IT) so that the troops can do even better what
they do superbly well already. America’s most pressing strategic problem,
really a condition so persistent, is that time after time military prowess is
not employed as effectively as it should be in the service of policy. This is
the zone of strategic surprise that potentially could prove fatal to America’s
role as the principal ordering agent that the world requires. The challenge
is partly for the Army to be adaptable to diverse political contexts, and to
be able to undertake missions that transcend traditional warﬁghting. With
its planned transformation, the Services would seem to have recognized
these challenges and to have stepped up boldly to remake themselves to
meet them. Just how successful the Army will prove to be in its proclaimed
goal of changing its culture remains to be seen. The greater challenge,
however, is for America’s policymakers to understand: (1) the strengths and
limitations of the military instrument that they are using; (2) the nature and
character of war; and (3) the cultural attitudes both of our enemies and of
ourselves. Transformation is most needed in an enhanced adaptability for
effectiveness in different political circumstances. Policymakers must only
resort to force with a careful regard to the desired political consequences
and with a sustained will to license the actions necessary to achieve them.
viii

TRANSFORMATION AND STRATEGIC SURPRISE
Just when we found the answer, they changed the question.
Anonymous
We judge the unknown to be unlikely.
S. Douglas Smith, 20041
It is impossible to predict the future, and all attempts to do so in any
detail appear ludicrous within a few years.
Arthur C. Clarke, 19622

INTRODUCTION
As a highly pragmatic discipline, strategic studies follows events,
both those that are actual and those that are widely anticipated. The
concept of surprise is intellectually fashionable today. However, it is not
at all self-evident what the practical implications are or ought to be. In
common with its conceptual stablemate, asymmetry, surprise deﬁnes
a content-free zone. It has no inherent meaning, save with respect to
its logical opposite. Surprise and asymmetry must be deﬁned solely
with reference to what they are not. This rather unhelpful, academic
seeming, point happens to have major real-world implications. The
defense community has signed on for yet another big idea that it is ill
equipped to pursue purposefully, if indeed such pursuit is feasible at
all.
Historically, American strategic theorists and defense analysts
have taken their cues from the signals of concern transmitted by
ofﬁcials. Those ofﬁcial signals typically have been triggered by events.
For example, the entire conceptual ediﬁce of the theory of stable
mutual deterrence was created in the 1950s, following the ﬁrst public
explanation of a coherent U.S. nuclear strategy by the Eisenhower
administration in 1953-54.3 The administration was seeking to
incorporate nuclear weapons into national strategy, in the context of
1

the lessons of the war just concluded, at least frozen by an armistice,
in Korea; the development of fusion weapons; the expansion of the
nuclear stockpile; and, of course, the growth of the Soviet nuclear
threat in quantity and quality.4 In the mid 1970s, there was a brief ﬂurry
of analytical interest in the problems of surprise attack, with speciﬁc
reference to the possibility of Soviet forces in Europe catching the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) unawares on the Central
Front of the inner-German border.5 Moving fast-forward to today, a
U.S. defense community, civilian and military, that traditionally has
been all but comprehensively uninterested in irregular warfare, now
has rushed predictably to where the policy action is most lively, and
the money is most readily accessible.
Only a few years ago, the writing of books and other studies on
terrorism was a distinctly minority pursuit in the intellectual wing
of the defense community. Today, such an endeavor is virtually
mandatory if one aspires to be a part of the fashionable, and funded,
crowd. Whereas even in the 1990s, let alone during the Cold War
decades, experts on terrorism and other forms of irregular warfare
were exceedingly thin on the ground, now they are truly abundant.
Indeed, today it is rare to ﬁnd a defense expert who does not claim
counterterrorist competency in his or her portfolio of professional
skills.
A problem with intellectual fashion is that, by its very nature, it must
change. In the case of national defense, it will change as policymakers
react to the circumstances that beset them. The ofﬁcial, and attendantdependent, worldview moves on, leaving in its wake yesterday’s Big
Idea. In the ﬁeld of war and strategy, there are no new ideas. Rather
there is a storehouse of concepts and theories which are the products
of two and a half millennia of intellectual and pragmatic rumination
on strategic experience. “Ideas persons,” intellectual leaders perhaps,
for the U.S. defense community go to that storehouse periodically
and rediscover the high merit in some well-known, but probably long
neglected, notion. This is how it is with strategic surprise and, indeed,
with its conceptual fellow traveller, the asymmetric threat.6
Lest some readers believe that this author has strayed into
exaggeration with his claims for the contemporary authority of
the notion of surprise, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld can
be quoted to settle the issue. Aside from the swipe at the previous
administration, the Secretary’s words express a view that now is
2

consensual across the political spectrum. In his Annual Report for 2002
he advised as follows:
Well before the events of September [2001], senior Defense Department
ofﬁcials, through the vehicle of the Quadrennial Defense Review, determined
that contending with uncertainty must be a central tenet in U.S. defense
planning. Too much of the Department’s planning over the decade of the
1990s had focused on a few familiar dangers rather than the broad array
of potential challenges of consequence to U.S. interests and the nation’s
inherent vulnerability to asymmetric attacks. They concluded that U.S.
defense planning must assume that surprise is the norm, rather than the
exception. Adapting to surprise―adapting quickly and decisively―must
be a hallmark of 21st century defense planning.7

Since terrorism has been identiﬁed as the deﬁning threat of this era,
and since it can only succeed by surprise, it has to follow, syllogistically,
that surprise is a, if not the, master strategic concept or principle of
our time. Unfortunately, surprise, along with such other Big Ideas
as asymmetry, uncertainty, and friction, for a few examples, is not
easy to operationalize outside a narrow band of tactical parameters.8
The superpowers could, and did, procure and operate diverse and
complex strategic force postures which were designed to deny success
to a would-be surprise attacker. The military challenge was eminently
quantiﬁable, at least it appeared to be so. But, what is one to make of,
let alone do with, the ofﬁcial advice that surprise is the norm? That
sensible sounding declamation is about as useful as the oxymoronic
maxim to “expect the unexpected.”
The purpose of this monograph is to make a modest contribution
to improving understanding of strategic surprise, especially with
reference to the process of military transformation. I believe that
the idea frequently is wrongly conceptualized, that errors in basic
understanding can promote undue pessimism on our part, and that
the whole subject is overdue for a complete review. With a mind,
ultimately, to the implications of my argument for the armed forces
in general, and the Army in particular, this monograph attempts to
stimulate and contribute to just such a review.
The discussion is organized into subjects which accommodate a
total argument with seven points, three of them serving as conclusions.
As a roadmap to what follows, I will close this introduction with a
summary of the major points explored and advanced below.
3

Bureaucratic Reform.
1. Reorganization of intelligence bureaucracies can be useful, but
is only marginally important for reduction in the risks of strategic
surprise.
Understanding the Condition.
2. Surprise effect, not surprise, is the challenge.
3. Some unpleasant surprises are reliably avoidable.
Levels of Analysis.
4. The geopolitical context is the most important.
Conclusions: Implications for the Army.
5. Do not exaggerate the dangers from surprise.
6. Minimum regrets must be a guiding principle.
7. The operational level of warfare is not the whole of war. An
attractive and persuasive vision of a transformed Army, though an
essential forward step, in itself is no guarantee of military behavior
strongly supportive of political goals.
These seven points cumulatively expose the nature of the problem,
or condition, of strategic surprise. They are guided by a sustained focus
upon an attempt to improve the Army’s appreciation of the challenge
of strategic surprise. From that appreciation should ﬂow an improved
understanding of how it may need to behave with its transformed
force so as to be more responsive to the demands that policy may send
its way.9
To launch the substance of this enquiry in the appropriate spirit,
we will quote the immortal wisdom of Yogi Berra. Yogi offered advice
for the ages when he said, or is reported to have said, “prediction is
difﬁcult, particularly about the future.”
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Bureaucratic Reform.
1. Reorganization of intelligence bureaucracies can be useful, but is only
of marginal importance for reduction in the risks of strategic surprise. There
is always a case for some bureaucratic reorganization intended to
achieve the kind of reform that should lead to improved performance.
But historical experience and common sense tell us that the intelligent
and praiseworthy urge to reorganize for reform is near certain to
disappoint. Whereas, on the one hand, better organization should
yield a better intelligence product, on the other, such improvement
is more likely to be only of marginal value. Bureaucratic reform
endeavors typically are motivated more by the political necessity to
be seen to be doing something about a recent intelligence failure, than
they are by a serious and sincere determination to make a difference.
The truth is that there are systemic reasons why bureaucratic reform,
no matter how well designed and executed, is close to irrelevant to
the problem of coping with strategic surprise, particularly the kind of
political surprise that is the focus of this monograph.
This is not to deny that suitable reforms should treat a few of the
endemic pathologies of the intelligence and warning community, at
least for a while. Certainly it is possible that a reformed intelligence
community could save the country grief on occasion;10 indeed, the
Central Intelligence Agency was designed with just such a purpose
in mind. Such a community would be so structured as to encourage
both information sharing and competitive assessments, as well as to
ensure a proper professional separation between the producer and
the user of information. This monograph is not at all hostile to the
reform of the intelligence community. I do insist, however, that the
preferred pathway to coping with the difﬁculties of surprise does not
lead through bureaucratic reform.
As this inquiry will make all too plain, bureaucratic reform
simply cannot address the real problems. Those problems, and such
solutions and alleviation as we can identify, are beyond the reach of
administrative reshufﬂes. They have to do with the very nature of
the subject of surprise and the reasons why it can be so dangerous.
Also, they derive from the facts that, for good and ill with regard to
intelligence, our analysts must function culturally as Americans within
the embrace of a hugely decentralized structure of central government.
5

It is worth noting that those latter potential hindrances are relatively
minor when compared with the point registered previously. The
true source of difﬁculty lies with the nature of the subject of strategic
surprise.
For laudable reasons, politicians and ofﬁcials are always in
search of ways to control events. The adoption of stable deterrence
as the jewel in the crown of America’s Cold War strategic policy is
a classic example of this desire made into policy. Today, although
deterrence has lost some of its former glitter,11 the U.S. Government
is still very much in the would-be control business. Strategies of
prevention and preemption are examples of ideas for the physical
control of the military capabilities of polities judged to be threatening.
Alas, preemption, understood correctly as attacking ﬁrst in the last
resort, requires a thoroughly reliable quality of warning that rarely
is attainable. Even forcible prevention, which translates as shoot on
strong suspicion, could be held to demand an improbable measure
of certainty about intelligence information. The uncomfortable fact is
that until an enemy actually initiates an attack, a decision to beat him
to the punch, by minutes, days, or months and years, unavoidably has
to be based on a leap of faith. No scheme to reorganize and reform the
intelligence bureaucracies can alter that fundamental reality.
Today it is orthodox to condemn the intelligence community for
relying too heavily upon technology in its information gathering. That
criticism is well-justiﬁed, provided it is not allowed to feed another
error. Human intelligence is not a panacea solution to the problem of
deﬁcient information. Those who would engineer, or “ﬁx,” America’s
intelligence and warning difﬁculties by shifting the balance between
machines and people in favor of the latter, need to be reminded of
some inconvenient facts. To cite but a few:
• People take years to train, and many more years to penetrate an
alien society and secure positions of trust in which they might
learn useful things.
• People, especially if recruited locally, will often be the subject
of some residual suspicion as to their loyalty.
• The possibility of the U.S., and Allied, intelligence community
having the right people in the right places at the right time, is
something of a long-shot.
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The U.S. Government may be told what historical records later
reveal to have been the truth, that an enemy had the intention of
attacking. But would policymakers in Washington either distinguish
the “signals” from the “noise,” or have sufﬁcient conﬁdence in the
“signals” that were recognized as such to take preventive action?12
Until an attack actually unfolds, one can always hope that the warning
signs do not really mean what they appear to indicate. Also, one can
choose to “go the extra mile for peace,” albeit in the teeth of apparent
evidence of malign intent, and hope that something will turn up to
divert the would-be attacker from his course. Perhaps he is blufﬁng!
Critics are right. For at least 30 years the United States has
overvalued the technical means of information gathering, at the
expense of the human. The critics would not be correct, however,
were they to try to insist that a major rebalancing of effort in favor
of human spies would have a truly signiﬁcant consequence for the
country’s ability to avoid, prevent, or preempt strategic surprise.
American culture, including its strategic and military culture(s),
has long been highly machine-minded. It is attracted to the deﬁnition
of conditions as problems that lend themselves to assault by the
Yankee know-how that produces the “engineering ﬁx.” In many
cases, this national self-conﬁdence, determination, and optimism
achieves wonders. But, there is a banal sounding yet profound maxim
before the wisdom of which even a proud superpower is compelled to
bow: “the impossible really is impossible.” Reform of the intelligence
community and its ways of doing business might be of some marginal
utility, though it is well to heed the caveat that such reform has a
way of balancing the improvements that it implements with new
bureaucratic pathologies. One should never forget the authority of the
law of unintended consequences. Purveyors of bright new, or old but
refurbished, ideas to improve intelligence as a barrier against strategic
surprise might with proﬁt heed these words by philosopher John Gray:
“The history of ideas obeys a law of irony. Ideas have consequences;
but rarely those their authors expect or desire, and never only those.
Quite often they are the opposite.”13
From Carl von Clausewitz to Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie, USN, great
strategic theorists have pointed to control as being the essence of the
practical object in war, the purpose of strategic effect.14 The subject of
this monograph, at root, is how better might we control the dangers
that imperil our security. Because of its current, partial hegemonic,
7

status as well as for reasons of its national culture, strategic and
military inter alia, the United States is especially vulnerable to
seduction by unsound ideas. A democratic country burdened with
great security tasks will never ﬁnd itself short of advice. The market
for palliatives is open for trading. Its global responsibilities, and the
vulnerabilities that attend them, as well as its traditional problemsolving optimism, mandate great caution in approaching the challenge
of strategic surprise. Wishful thinking and ethnocentrism conﬂate
potently to mislead. Unfortunately, it is one thing to recognize the
unhelpful inﬂuence of national culture, it is quite another to identify
practical ways to correct for that source of pervasive bias. We are what
we are. The U.S. Government can reorganize itself in any way that
the political process will tolerate, but it must continue to be operated
by those who are culturally American. One senses that possibly the
authors of the U.S. Army’s excellent design for radical transformation,
including the commitment literally to “transform its culture,” may
need to take more account than they anticipate of their national
proclivities.15
Strategic surprise can, with some good fortune, be controlled in its
consequences, as this monograph will reveal and argue. However, that
control cannot be advanced signiﬁcantly by the “ﬁx” of bureaucratic
reorganization and reform. Indeed, as we have suggested already, new
organizational and command structures in the intelligence world are
likely to generate new difﬁculties that will offset much of the beneﬁt
anticipated to ﬂow from the reforms.
The producers and the consumers of intelligence need to keep their
distance, if the product is not to be contaminated by the beliefs and
concerns of policymakers. In principle, the intelligence product can
be protected from policy bias. But in practice, it is close to impossible
to avoid the shaping and coloration of intelligence both by the policy
of the moment and, no less signiﬁcantly, by the assumptions that
are current and authoritative within the defense community as a
whole. And that is to ignore the phenomenon of deliberate attempts
by policymakers to encourage the delivery of an intelligence product
supportive of their beliefs and intentions. Human nature and the
political process usually triumphs over organizational reform.
If strategic surprise is deﬁned as a problem in want of “ﬁxing,”
then the mission is indeed beyond rescue. Some readers may believe,
or suspect, that strategic surprise as a problem really can be hugely
8

alleviated, if not deﬁnitively solved, by the right mix of technical
or administrative advances. To answer those optimists, I offer an
historical observation. A century of cumulatively monumental change
in technology and governmental organization has had no appreciable
effect upon the U.S. ability to eliminate the danger of strategic
surprise. 9/11 speaks for itself. The prosecution rests.
Fortunately, though, the mission of coping well enough with
strategic surprise is far from hopeless, always provided it is
conceptualized properly and approached with due respect for its
nature. That optimistic judgment, aspiration perhaps, leads directly
to the next section.
Understanding the Problem.
2. Surprise effect, not surprise, is the challenge. Surprise happens! To
adapt the vulgar bumper sticker message. History’s nonlinearities,
acts of God, the transmutation of familiar trends into something quite
different, the “normal accidents” that afﬂict all complex systems,16 and
the cunning plans of devious foes, all can surprise us. But surprise is
not really the problem. In fact, surprise is not a problem at all, rather a
condition of the insecurity in which we must live. By analogy, superior
intelligence, per se, is toothless, because there has to be someone at the
sharp end to use it to inﬂict pain on the enemy. Similarly, surprise,
per se, is of little, if any, value. The question is always, “what are
its consequences?” In a quite brilliant brief analysis, James Wirtz
penetrates much of the way to the heart of our subject. He explains
that,
Surprise temporarily suspends the dialectical nature of warfare (or any
other strategic contest) by eliminating an active opponent from the
battleﬁeld. Surprise turns war into a stochastic exercise in which the
probability of some event can be determined with a degree of certainty
or, more rarely, an event in which the outcome can be not only known in
advance, but determined by one side in the conﬂict.17

Surprise attack has the potential to suspend war’s nature as a duel,
by eliminating its dialectic. Thus might Clausewitz be confounded. In
practice, though, it is exceedingly rare for a belligerent to be eliminated
totally as a consequence of surprise. Ideally, a surprise assault would
render its target enemy an all but helpless victim, unable to recover
9

from the initial disadvantage in which it was placed. Theoretically,
this idea is more than faintly reminiscent of the basic idea behind John
Boyd’s observation, orientation, decision, action (OODA) loop.18 By
a surprising speed in our OODA cycle, we will begin, and remain,
within the action or reaction time of the like cycle of the enemy. He
will never be able to recover. So much for theory and high aspiration.
Boyd extrapolated from tactical air combat into the far more rareﬁed
zones of strategy and policy. A belligerent may be tactically, even
operationally, vulnerable to surprise, yet still be strategically highly
resilient. Witness the grim experience of the Soviet Union in 1941. A
theory that is sound at the tactical and operational levels, is apt to be
thwarted by the factors of time, distance, and scale, at the strategic.
By deﬁnition, surprise is controlled by the enemy. He has the
initiative. If this were not so, the events in question would not be
surprises. But, the consequences of surprise are controlled by us, not
the enemy. Only in the rarest of cases is a strategic or operational level
surprise itself so damaging that the defender is rendered incapable
of recovery. Whether or not recovery is possible must depend upon
both moral and physical factors. In 1940 and 1941, both Britain and the
Soviet Union would have fallen along with France, had their national
geographies not gifted them the barriers of water or sheer distance
which provided time for recovery.
It is understandable, and indeed necessary, for the intelligence
community to strive as best it is able to prevent our being surprised by
malevolent foes. After all, if there is no surprise, there can be none of
surprise’s potentially harmful, even deadly, consequences. However,
surprise prevention, though an important goal, is mission impossible,
at least it is if we harbor absurd ambitions to inhabit a risk-free security
environment. It must follow that the defense community as a whole
has no practical choice other than to accept that surprise happens; it
is a condition of doing national security business. This is not a feature
unique to the contemporary world. Surprise has always been an actual
or potential characteristic of warfare. This has to be so because since
“[w]ar is nothing but a duel on a larger scale,” in the ageless words of
the Prussian master.19 Clausewitz explains that “[c]ountless duels go to
make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining
a pair of wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the
other to do his will.” Duelling enemies must ever be motivated to try to
behave in a manner that “eliminates war’s dialectic.”20 The feasibility
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of surprise at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of conﬂict
will shift with technology, but in theory at least its attractions remain
constant. We should hasten to add that its potential disadvantages
also persist through time. This is not the right juncture at which to
pursue in detail the possible downside of surprise. Two maxims will
sufﬁce for now to convey much of that downside: “nothing is so apt to
fail as incomplete success”; and “you need to kill a king, not offer him
insult and injury.”
Basil Liddell Hart stated the vital distinction that I am emphasizing
in his analysis of the British victory in the Battle of Messines on
June 7, 1917. The British assault was anything but a surprise. “The
bombardment and wire-cutting’ began on May 21st, were developed
on May 28th, and culminated in a 7-days’ intense bombardment,
mingled with practice barrages to test the arrangements.”21 General
Plumer’s Second Army had virtually sent the Germans an invitation
to the ﬁght. But, as Liddell Hart explains,
The consequent forfeiture of surprise did not matter in the Messines
stroke, a purely limited attack, in contrast to that at Arras, where it had
been fatal to the hope of a breakthrough. For although there was no
surprise there was surprise effect . . . produced by the mines [19 of them!]
and the overwhelming ﬁre. . . and this lasted long enough to gain the
short-distanced objectives that had been set. The point, and the distinction
between actual surprise and surprise effect, are of signiﬁcance to the theory of
warfare.22

The distinction advertised so clearly by Liddell Hart is indeed
of great signiﬁcance. The effects of surprise were limited severely in
1917 by the technological deﬁciencies of the day. Because they lacked
mobility, armies were unable to exploit tactical success rapidly for
operational advantage. Also, generals were hampered fatally by
the absence of reliable real-time communications. By the time of the
second great war of the 20th century, technology and doctrine had
largely alleviated those inhibitors of 1917.23
I am suggesting strongly that our problem is not surprise and its
frustration. Indeed, it is more sensible to regard surprise as a condition
rather than a problem. Instead, our problem is to cope well enough
with the effects of those surprises that we are bound to fail to prevent.
It is important to add that the challenge of surprise effect includes the
case addressed in the quotations from Liddell Hart. Even when we
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are not really surprised by, for example, the failure of an attempt to
dissuade, deter, or coerce short of the use of force, still we could be
hugely surprised by the actions the enemy takes and, above all else,
by their effects.
Notwithstanding the contemporary prominence accorded what
is misnamed as preemption, it is a near certainty that, as a general
rule, the United States and its friends and allies will not often be
the initiators of military action. Of course, in theory at least there is
a class of strategic challenge that points the other way. In its Final
Report, the 9/11 Commission offered the following as the ﬁrst of its
recommendations:
The U.S. Government must identify and prioritize actual or potential
terrorist sanctuaries. For each, it should have a realistic strategy to keep
possible terrorists insecure and on the run, using all elements of national
power. We should reach out, listen to, and work with other countries that
can help.24

Those ambivalent words appear to advise sending U.S. marshals
(and bounty hunters?) into bandit country to get the bad guys. But
also they seem to reﬂect some reluctance to “do the business,” to ﬁnd
and kill terrorists. Even the mighty United States cannot ﬂout the
lore of war and strategy with impunity. Strategists of many nations
have sought the silver bullet, the magic formula, truly the all purpose
panacea, that should deliver certain victory. Did not the Baron Antoine
Henri de Jomini promise victory to the army that behaved according
to the correct principles, especially according to his great principle?25
Recall that in 2003 the U.S. attack on Iraq was anything but a surprise.
However, there were those in Washington who believed, at least
seriously entertained the hope, that an opening “shock and awe”
bombardment from the air, would have the surprise effect of rendering
the enemy either incapable of resistance or unwilling to resist.26 It
failed. Moreover, it was thoroughly misconceived as an approach
to a conﬂict wherein the United States was seeking to liberate and
not to conquer. The belief in panacea solutions to war’s inconvenient
complexities and complications is apparently eternal. Neither the
killing of terrorists largely by our unilateral efforts, nor reaching out,
listening, and working with allies, will function as a wonder drug.
However, both are needed.
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Conceptually, we have stressed the need to distinguish between
surprise and surprise effect. In a more practical vein, we will offer the
reminder that, prominent among the strategist’s analytical weapons,
should be a skeptical mindset and a readiness to pose the challenging
question, “so what?” To be caught by surprise is no disgrace for a
superpower that has accepted a global domain for its security interests
and therefore responsibilities.27 Some of the surprises in America’s
future will be agreeable, many will be of no particular consequence,
while a few, inevitably, will bear upon issues of signiﬁcant, even vital,
national concern. The challenge to the defense planner and strategist
is not to avoid being surprised. Rather it is to plan against some of the
more dire potential effects of surprise.
The logic of the argument is inexorable. Since surprise cannot be
prevented reliably, there is simply no alternative to our focusing upon
its potential consequences. Fortunately, though, with the noteworthy
exception of a nuclear attack on a large scale, it is highly improbable
that strategic surprise would achieve useful, let alone conclusive,
strategic ends for its perpetrator. It has to follow that our attention
should be drawn far more to the possible consequences of surprise,
than to a forlorn hope to frustrate its achievement. The U.S. Army
cannot transform itself precisely into the “right” force for a future that
we know must contain many surprising duties. But, that Army can
transform itself so that it is “right enough,” which is to say sufﬁciently
adaptable, to cope well enough with the effects of a genuinely wide
range of demanding missions. Of particular importance is the need
for the Army to consider the surprising effects of its own action, and
inaction, in the actual conduct of war. As this monograph develops
later, the possible surprise effects that should be of most concern
are political in nature. Waging warfare is political behavior, albeit
with military tools. Policy is not the responsibility of the Army, but
the ways in which the Army ﬁghts must have profound political
consequences.
3. Some unpleasant surprises should be reliably avoidable. Clausewitz
tells us that “[n]o other human activity [than war] is so continuously
and universally bound up with chance. And through the element
of chance, guesswork and luck come to play a great part in war.”28
Because “[w]ar is the realm of chance,”29 meaning that uncertainty is
apt to rule, it is essential that we eliminate such among the risks as lend
themselves to accurate assessment. Most important of all is the need
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to correct avoidable ignorance. The enemy may well surprise us, with
both his initiatives and their effects, but if we fail to grasp the nature
and purpose of war, we are guilty of inﬂicting the severest penalties
on our forces. If the nature of war is not understood correctly, then
policy, which is to say the purpose of it all, is likely to be frustrated,
and lives and treasure will be sacriﬁced in vain.
This section of the analysis levels a charge at, and poses a
question to, the U.S. Armed Forces. The charge is that war and
warfare not infrequently have been confused, with the result that
Antulio J. Echevarria II highlighted in his study, Toward an American
Way of War. Building on Russell Weigley’s respected work on The
American Way of War, Echevarria brings the American story up to
date.
Their [the Americans in Weigley’s book] concept of war rarely extended
beyond the winning of battles and campaigns to the gritty work of turning
military victory into strategic success, and hence was more a way of battle
than an actual way of war. Unfortunately, the American way of battle has
not yet matured into a way of war.30

There is, of course, another and contrasting American way of war,
as Echevarria correctly notes. In its extensive historical experience of
irregular warfare, which is to say of warfare against irregulars, the
U.S. Armed Forces were rarely able to defeat their enemies by decisive
maneuver and conclusive battle.31 There is no doubt, though, that
the Napoleonic ideal of successful warmaking has been iconic. It is
uncontentious to claim, by analogy, that in the 20th century, Germany
proved exceptionally competent in the bloody trade of ﬁghting, yet,
fortunately, outstandingly incompetent at making war. To lose one
world war in a 30-year period might be attributed to bad luck, but
to lose two requires a more systemic explanation. The United States
betrays some disturbing elements of the problems that Germany failed
to recognize and correct. Tersely put, the United States has been better
at waging warfare than it is at conducting war for its only legitimate
purposes, which must be political.32
I will brave the possible ire of some readers by going further than
does Echevarria in his persuasive critique. He charges the dominant
American way of war, past and present, with resting on a concept of
war that fails to make the necessary connection between military
and strategic success. That charge is well made, but it does not go
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far enough. The purpose of war is not strategic, rather it is political,
success. Moreover, the object of war, as Liddell Hart insisted, should
be “a better peace.”33 He was expressing the core rationale of the
long traditional religious concepts of Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello. In
other words, war is about the peace that follows. Necessarily, in this
perspective, warfare must be waged with a mind to the character of
the postwar settlement that is sought.
This section levels one charge and poses one question. The
charge, that war and warfare are apt to be confused by the U.S.
Armed Forces and by the civilians who oversee and direct them, is
somewhat controversial. By contrast, my question may attract an
answer that is controversial in the extreme. Stated bluntly: “Is the
U.S. defense establishment insufﬁciently committed to effecting the
right transformation?” Appearances to the contrary, perhaps, this is
not to criticize the Army’s transformation plans, still less the sensible
words, even near revolutionary sentiments, with which those plans
are explained. Rather, their cause is to worry lest a more agile and
adaptable Army will be employed in such a way that it commits old
sins against the political-military lore of war in more effective ways.
I suggest that the impressive Army transformation that is underway,
particularly its determination to alter the mindset in favor of Joint and
Expeditionary campaigning,34 is not really the transformation most
needed by the country. What the American sheriff requires most is
a transformation in its ability to threaten or employ force to advance
its political goals. It is difﬁcult to avoid noticing that the various
“roadmaps” to transformation, not excluding the claimed Strategic
Approach of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) Ofﬁce of Force
Transformation, provide no very convincing linkage between military
excellence and ultimate political beneﬁt―or even just recognition that
such linkage is of the utmost importance.35 In fact, it is precisely and
strictly that linkage that legitimizes and gives meaning to military
behavior. A cynic, perhaps a skeptic, might be excused observing that
the U.S. military is in the process of improving its ability to do that
which it already does well. That military is unsurpassed in decisive
maneuver and the delivery of precise ﬁrepower. And those abilities
really matter, one must hasten to add. Moreover, it is probable that a
transforming Army will be more capable of waging war both against
irregular enemies, as well as against regular foes who are obliged by
America’s material strengths to behave in an irregular mode. But, the
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conduct of war is not the issue here, it is not what war is all about.
Historian Peter Browning provides some useful clariﬁcation, beyond,
that is, the bedrock of Clausewitz’s dictum that “[w]ar, therefore, is an
act of policy.”36 Browning explains that “[w]arfare is the act of making
war. War is a relationship between two states or, if a civil war, two
groups. Warfare is only a part of war, although the essential part.”37
The United States has some history of being unpleasantly
surprised: in minor key by its difﬁculty in translating military success
into strategic success; and in major key by the problem of turning
strategic success or advantage into a political victory that can be
expressed in a desirable postwar settlement. The United States has
been surprised in war after war, and in imbroglios great and small,
to discover that somehow, somewhere, it had misplaced the glue that
should connect its undoubted military prowess with its anticipated
political reward. This surprise, notwithstanding its magnitude, in
theory at least is eminently avoidable. All that is required is a sound
strategic education. Unfortunately, though, the principal source of the
problem lies not with particular ofﬁcials, who can be easily replaced,
but rather with national strategic and military cultures that approach
warfare and politics as unduly distinctive behaviors.
My charge is that the United States has favored a way of war, more
aptly perhaps a way with war, which has deprived its warriors, and
the country, of political rewards earned and deserved by their blood.
Given that our subject is the superpower guardian of world order, this
allegation is no small matter. We must not exaggerate. There have been
politically effective exercises of U.S. military power. By far the most
impressive example was the Civil War. But, alas, we cannot count on
having an Abraham Lincoln on hand when we need him. There have
been too many cases, both great and small, when American military
effort was not directed, or exploited, effectively for the political, and
other (e.g., humanitarian), purposes of the enterprise. Those cases
include World War I; World War II in Europe; the worst phases of the
Korean War; Vietnam, of course; Lebanon; Iraq in 1991; Somalia in
1993; Kosovo in 1999; Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq in 2003. Military
victory is always important, nay vital. But it is no guarantor of policy
triumph. It is not as yet clear to this commentator that the undoubtedly
worthy and worthwhile momentum of military transformation is
going to feed very usefully into the transformation that the United
States needs most urgently. Above all else, the United States needs
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a transformation in its ability to wield the sword with political skill.
There is a word for this function, it is strategy.
It is not very helpful to criticize American society, and by
extension its armed forces, for being and acting as they have to be
and do. Nonetheless, with appropriate acknowledgement to Sun-tzu,
it should be useful to remind people that accurate self-knowledge
is at least as important as is knowledge of the enemy.38 In its more
technological variants, the contemporary American process of military
transformation rests heavily upon, indeed requires, “information
dominance.”39 The Army’s vision is more sophisticated, as one would
expect, given its focus on the warriors rather than their tools.40 But it has
yet to be demonstrated that a transforming force will strive as seriously
to understand the enemy as it will to locate him for his obliteration. I
suggest that there is inadequate appreciation of the apolitical bias in
American strategic thought and action. The information dominance
that is the ambition of some “transformers” is apt to be too narrowly
military in conception. The U.S. way in warfare systematically
prejudices its policy goals. The revolution in approach that is needed
may prove to be beyond attainment by a nonpermissive American
culture. Although Americans are justly proud of their adaptability,
that useful virtue is constrained by culture.
On a slightly brighter note, it is worth saying that the beginning
of the process of identifying answers has to be discovery of the right
questions. Frank, if uncomfortable, recognition that the United States
has systemic difﬁculty translating military excellence into political
results can be the beginning of a broader approach to transformation.
We shall return to this central matter in a later section.
Levels of Analysis.
4. The geopolitical context is the most important. Most analyses of
surprise distinguish strategic, operational, and tactical levels of
concern, while some extend their reach to encompass the technological
also. Those studies are drawn inevitably into the on-going and longrunning debate over intelligence and how to improve it. That literature
is mature and useful in its way, but, nonetheless, typically it misses the
level of analysis that should be accorded logical and practical priority.
Namely, the literature on surprise, strategic and other, is not rich in
its treatment of geopolitical context. Since all our strategic concerns,
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including anxieties over surprise attack, ﬂow ultimately from the
character of their historical context, this neglect, even omission, is as
strange as it is unfortunate.
Context, from the Latin contextere, has two meanings. It may refer
to “that which surrounds,” which now is its everyday meaning, while
also it can mean “that which weaves together.”41 When we worry about
strategic surprise, especially in connection with a long-term program
of military transformation, the enquiry should begin with geopolitical
contextual, rather than strategic, operational, or tactical uncertainties.
Problems at those levels derive basically from the political context
which gives them meaning. In case the trajectory of this monograph
seems to have strayed into remote terrain, I will state my purpose here
in the most direct manner possible. It is of the utmost importance to
address the question of the character of the global environment for
which we are transforming the Armed Forces. Surprise at this level of
concern has a way of triggering traumatic consequences. The familiar
kinds of analyses which treat strategic, operational, and tactical
surprise, do not usually raise their sights to consider the context for it
all. Lest inadvertently I am sending the wrong message, I must rush
to declare my enthusiasm for measures judged useful to reduce the
possibility of our being caught by strategic, operational, and tactical
surprise. I am far from dismissive of the importance of that perpetual
endeavor. However, this analysis takes a different tack, one which
approaches military transformation more from the perspective of the
source of challenges to its adequacy and appropriateness. To ﬁt what
kind of a world is the Army transforming itself? What range, quantity,
and intensity of duties will, or plausibly might, U.S. foreign policy lay
upon the Army?
It would not be wholly unreasonable to argue that the questions
just posed are neither researchable nor answerable. After all, the
future has not happened, and the planned transformation does
not, to the best of my knowledge, carry any promise of time travel.
Unfortunately, my questions are neither merely rhetorical, nor are
they academic in a pejorative sense. DoD is committed to a long-term
process of transformation which must shape military capability, and
hence its utility as an instrument of policy, for decades ahead. What
does the Army know, or think it knows, about the world of 20 or 30
years hence for which it is now in the process of transforming itself?
Of course, there is an obvious sense in which the answer to such a
18

question is above the paygrade of military professionals. We hire and
ﬁre politicians to decide such things. Nonetheless, there is a great
chain of reasoning which connects the Army’s transformation plans,
dynamic as they must be, to working assumptions about the contexts
for which those plans will need to be well enough suited. That “great
chain” comprises the latest National Security Strategy (2002), Quadrennial
Defense Review (2001), The National Defense Strategy (2005), and National
Military Strategy (2004) documents, which provide guidance for the
Army Campaign Plan, a design which speciﬁes the assumptions on
which it is based.42 Fortunately, we are far from blind when peering
into the future, even without the beneﬁt of crystal balls or time travel.
As a practical matter, whether one is optimistic or pessimistic about
defense planners’ abilities to “get it right enough” for the mediumterm future, those responsible ofﬁcials have no choice but to do
their best from a situation of irreducible fundamental uncertainty. A
scholar, supposedly expert, can make faulty predictions, and move
on to the next project with no apparent adverse consequences. The
rare exception would be the “expert” who enjoyed a quality of access
to policymaking that enabled him to infect that process with his
erroneous guidance.
The news is by no means all of doom and gloom, as the next section
makes suitably plain. There are ways to minimize the risk that the
Armed Forces will transform themselves into a military instrument
signiﬁcantly unsuited to the world in which they must operate. For
now, however, it is necessary to highlight, explain, and illustrate
historically, the primacy of context.
The context for U.S. national security truly is a unity. Each relevant
dimension impinges upon, and interweaves with, the others. However,
it is convenient and useful to identify three contexts, never forgetting
that this trinity is compatible with the essential unity referred to above.
The contexts which will fuel strategic surprise are the geopolitical,
the cultural, and the technological. These are not neatly distinctive,
fenced-off realms. Furthermore, the geopolitical is by far the most
important of the three.
Politics is about power. War is about politics. If organized violence
is not politically motivated, it is not war. It has to follow that war,
strategy, and defense preparation, including military transformation,
of course, also are about power. But what is the power, really the relative
power, story for which the Army is in the process of transforming
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itself? Rephrased, what should today’s transformers understand, and
assume, about the relevant geopolitical future? Errors committed at
this most elevated level of analysis could literally lose us the country.
We might choose to recall a comment by one of Hitler’s intimates,
shortly before his meeting with destiny at Nuremberg. Field Marshall
Keitel, not a man generally known for his wisdom, observed that
errors in tactics and operations can be corrected in a current war, while
mistakes in strategy can be corrected only in the next. One should add
that Germany failed to abide by that principle. The higher the level
of concern, the more serious the stakes. The level of concern for our
contemporary transformers does not come any more elevated than
the geopolitical context.
Tectonic, apparently nonlinear, shifts in the geopolitical context
happen. In fact, they happen not infrequently. Consider the differences
in the U.S. geopolitical context between the 1900s and the late 1910s,
the 1930s and the early 1940s, the mid-1940s and the Cold War decades,
and the 1980s and the 1990s. In the 1980s, for excellent reasons, the
U.S. Armed Forces prepared for a geopolitical context that was to
vanish in less than a decade. One might add that the preparation was
not wholly unconnected with the geopolitical revolution in question.43
The 1990s, the post-Cold War era, was a no-name decade that had
no dominant organizing geopolitical feature. American primacy was
recognized, but not really articulated or very productively exercised.
9/11 changed all that.
Is the Army transforming itself for a geopolitical context wherein the
United States will long, indeed indeﬁnitely, remain the unchallenged
military hegemon? Does it need to adjust, albeit painfully, to a world
wherein it will not require the ability to wage “heavy” combat against
major states, and perhaps not against states at all? Should it “lighten
up,” perhaps “down,” and become ever more Special Forces (SF)-like
in order to ﬁt suitably into a geopolitical context wherein America’s
enemies are variably, but emphatically, irregular? The answers to
questions such as these are of the highest importance for the shape and
direction of the long process of military transformation. Fortunately, it
is possible to provide answers in which at least some conﬁdence can
be placed. On the evidence available at present, the Army is adapting
itself prudently for a future that may include combat against both
regular and irregular enemies. Moreover, the Army recognizes that
even regular adversaries are likely to rely heavily on “asymmetric
20

means” so as “to mitigate their relative disadvantage.”44 It is reassuring
to note the Army’s explicit recognition that “[t]hreats from potentially
hostile regional powers remain.”45
Strategic surprise on the greatest of scales occurs as a result of
changes in the contexts for national security. Although we identiﬁed
a contextual trinity of politics, culture, and technology, as the prime
sources of strategic upheaval, we also insisted that politics, rephrased
as the geopolitical for its relevance to war and strategy, is the driver
among those contexts. For example, by far the most signiﬁcant systemic
shock to U.S. national security over the past 20 years was the abrupt
retirement of the Soviet enemy from the geopolitical ﬁeld of honor.
This was one of history’s rarities, a benign great strategic surprise. The
information revolution and the consequent debate about revolution
in military affairs (RMA) and military transformation appear to many
people to register high on the Richter scale of strategic importance.
Nonetheless, the issues in those debates pale into near insigniﬁcance
compared with the impact of the alteration to the geopolitical landscape
caused by the reduction of the superpower column from two to one.
Although one could attempt to consider the contexts―geopolitical,
cultural, and technological―as independent variables, indeed many
studies do so, that approach is not favored here. Turning ﬁrst to the
cultural context for national security as a possible source of strategic
surprise, I am not persuaded that it is a context superior to, or greatly
inﬂuential over, the geopolitical dimension.46 And I say that as a long
time advocate of the necessity for cultural study in strategy.47 At
least, that is what I believe about the United States. My claim is that
American culture, insofar as it bears upon attitudes towards national
defense and war itself, is far more shaped by, than shaping, the
geopolitical context. This is not claimed as an eternal, let alone a
universal truth. It is, however, a claim with a powerful reach. For
example, it appears to be the case that, for a variety of historical
reasons, “Old Europe” has entered what amounts to a post-modern,
post-military era. Many of the societies of “Old Europe” have become
thoroughly debellicized.48 This commonly noted phenomenon
expresses: reactions to the bloody history of Europe in the 20th century;
the strategic fact that those societies have been security wards of the
U.S. superpower for more than 50 years; and a perilous assumption
that good security times are here to stay, irreversibly and therefore
indeﬁnitely. The anti-military culture of “Old Europe” is the product
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primarily of its currently permissive geopolitical context. Europeans
have discerned no need to take their own defense seriously. It is a
logical next step to convert a necessity into a virtue. They appear
not to have noticed, or perhaps have chosen to ignore, the several
signals from Moscow indicating an intention to restore some of its
global status and inﬂuence, probably in loose strategic and economic
association with a rising China.
In the American case, culture is not plausible as a potential source
of strategic surprise. Although culture, by deﬁnition, must reﬂect
deep-seated attitudes and habits, it is also very much a living context,
subject to inﬂuence by reactions to unfolding events. That claim
presumes that American culture is fundamentally permissive of a
wide range of foreign and defense policy behaviors, depending upon
circumstances. It is always possible that some populist politician might
appeal successfully to the isolationist strain in American society. If that
were to happen, the strategic surprise effect upon the national military
posture could, indeed should, be profound. However, this enquiry is
not persuaded that that event is at all likely. It is judged improbable
even if the country, performing as global sheriff, suffers much pain
and disappointment and, as a consequence, becomes seriously
resentful at the ingratitude of what, not without irony, is referred to
as the international community.49 This may not be true for all time,
but at least for now it is reasonably clear that the cultural context for
U.S. national security is a variable dependent upon perceptions of the
country’s geopolitical context. In the 1990s, American society did not
much care about the Balkans or the Horn of Africa, hence the spate
of writings on the need for a “post-heroic” American style in war.50
There are, of course, demographic and other sociological explanations
for a potentially policy– and strategy-enervating societal aversion to
the suffering, or even inﬂiction, of casualties. But, on balance, both
careful study and experience tell us that the claim for an extreme U.S.
casualty aversion is a myth, provided Americans really care about the
mission in question.51 What American society will not tolerate is the
conduct of hostilities in a half-hearted manner by an administration
that seems to have no notion of, or serious commitment to, victory.
American society is not likely to provide the kind of unpleasant
strategic surprise which would inhibit or prohibit perilous geopolitical
behavior. Culture follows politics, at least usually it does so.
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The third context potentially of importance for strategic surprise
is the technological. I will declare boldly, perhaps rashly, that
technological surprise is not a likely strategic problem for the U.S.
military. The depth, breadth, and consistency of the U.S. commitment
to military technological excellence, backed up by a civilian sector
technologically of the ﬁrst rank, all but guarantee against the surprise
emergence of a technological shortfall potentially lethal to national
security. In fact, the news is even better than that. So many and various
are the possible ways in joint warfare, so diverse and complex are
today’s tools of the military trade, that it would be highly implausible
to anticipate strategic disaster for reason of a particular technological
failing. That is the good news. The less good news is that the prudent
focus for concern is not so much upon new technologies, but rather
upon how other countries’ or groups’ ways of war might chose to
employ them. Some American commentators, reasonably, but alas
incorrectly, believe that, in its information-led RMA/transformation,
the U.S. defense establishment is simply leading the way in the
modern way in warfare.52 Given the global diffusion of information
technology (IT), and given a presumed universal military meaning
to common technological knowledge, it should follow that to know
the American way is to know the future for all who aspire to master
the state of the art in military affairs. Unfortunately, the world does
not work like that. The reasons why it does not are both geopolitical
and cultural. Geopolitically, America’s rivals will pick and choose
from the technological menu so as to privilege their unique strategic
advantages and hopefully to compensate for their deﬁciencies. Also,
it so happens that there is not and never has been a truly common
“grammar” of war.53 Different belligerents will have their own views
on how a basically common technology should be exploited. An
outstanding recent collection of essays on the impact of local culture
upon the consequences of the diffusion of technology and ideas offers
these cautionary words among its ﬁndings:
One of the central contributions of this volume is to alert practitioners to be
cautious in their expectations that the spread of new military knowledge
is easy or straightforward. It cannot be easily controlled, nor held back
indeﬁnitely. This is so for several key reasons. First, culture will continue
to shape the development and diffusion of military knowledge, producing
indigenous adaptations that will be difﬁcult to predict. True emulation is rare,
implying that others will probably not leverage the IT-RMA the same
way as the United States.54
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In a small gem of a book, Paul Hirst makes much the same point,
only more broadly. He advises that “[w]ar is driven by ideas about
how to use weapons and military systems almost as much as it is
by technical and organizational changes themselves. Ideas are thus
crucial . . .”55
To summarize the argument of this section: technology does not
pose a signiﬁcant threat of strategic surprise; rather does the challenge
lie in the unexpected uses that other strategic cultures may choose to
make of it. Overall, such uses would constitute grave threats to U.S.
national security only because of a geopolitical context characterized
by notable rivalries. Technology and culture and the strategic surprises
to which they might be crucial are strictly dependent variables. They
depend upon the political context for their strategic meaning.
Probably the most telling illustration of my argument that the
geopolitical context is king is to suggest a not entirely fanciful future
wherein the United States ﬁnds itself opposed not by mere “regional
powers,” but instead by what could amount to a “bloc” of states led
by a Sino-Soviet axis. There are many reasons why this may not occur,
but the prospect of the emergence of an effectively global superpower
adversary is a distinct possibility. The point here is not to suggest its
likelihood, but rather to indicate that such an unwelcome development
would have the most serious implications for U.S. defense plans
and posture. The Army’s transformation design favors agility and
adaptability, and seeks to be capable of achieving full spectrum
dominance in combat. All of which is admirable. However, the return
of what would amount to geopolitical bipolarity, most probably with
Europe striving to be neutral, would have to mean the maturing of
a quality, quantity, and variety of strategic challenge beyond the
scope of current policy assumptions. This hypothetical case is cited
not as a prediction, but rather, to repeat, as an illustration of relative
importance of the geopolitical context.
Conclusions: Implications for the Army.
Thus far the monograph has taken the problem, actually the
condition, of future strategic surprise exceedingly seriously. That
attitude, of course, is mandated by the nature of the subject; the stakes
may be high. However, we are far from helpless in the face of strategic
history’s potential to ambush us. At least, we are far from helpless
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if we keep our balance, respect what history can teach us if we so
allow, and if we take sensible precautions. Each of the three points of
the argument presented here as “Conclusions” are constructive and
fundamentally optimistic.
5. Do not exaggerate the dangers from surprise. The now distant, but
still culturally potent, example of Pearl Harbor, the trauma of 9/11,
and the rediscovery of the ancient attractions of preemption have
served to elevate awareness of surprise attack in ofﬁcial and public
consciousness. There is no denying that attacks apparently “out of the
blue” can wreak severe damage. The tactical success of such attacks
generally is attributable to the facts that ample signals of intention
were lost amidst the noise, or that policymakers chose not to believe
what their intelligence arms were trying to tell them. The pathologies
of intelligence gathering, assessment, and use, for policy, have been
well-explored by scholars, as well as revealed by retired ofﬁcials,
and need no further comment here. But how important is strategic
surprise? More precisely, how signiﬁcant might be its effects? During
the Cold War, no clever brieﬁng team in either capital stood much of a
chance of persuading political leaders that a massive surprise nuclear
attack could succeed in disarming the enemy, or otherwise rendering
him incapable of retaliation. This is not to deny, however, that a
cool appraisal of the possible danger did not always triumph over
a predisposition to believe the worst.56 Obviously, surprise, or very
short warning, nuclear attack was possible, and its effects must have
been close to, if not actually, history-ending for both parties, as well
as many others. From the mid 1960s at least, it was never plausible
to anticipate comprehensive success from a would-be disarming ﬁrst
strike. In principle, the peril of large-scale nuclear attack remains
today. For now, though, the geopolitical context renders the danger
strictly notional, since the only possible candidate for the role of
villain-disarmer, the Russian Federation, lacks the necessary political
motivation, at least so far as we can tell.57 As we keep insisting, the
condition of potential strategic surprise is driven by the geopolitical
context, not by technology, culture, or clever briefers.
History is our only guide to the future.58 It never repeats itself in
detail, but the problems and opportunities it reveals from the past
do not alter generically. That is the basic reason why the writings of
those contemporaries, Thucydides and Sun-tzu, and their even more
brilliant distant successor, Clausewitz, still speak to us meaningfully.
25

The feasibility of strategic surprise assuredly has increased with
the advent of air power, ballistic missiles, and the exploitation of
computers in war. But history alerts us to the fact that surprise is
no panacea solution to war’s imponderables. As a matter of record,
surprise attacks rarely have the effects that lead their perpetrators to
gain decisive victory. The law of unintended consequences strikes
ruthlessly. If anything, the surprise attacker, trusting in deception and
cunning to offset real weaknesses, is wont to begin a conﬂict that it
cannot ﬁnish.59 When great faith is placed in the presumed potency of
strategic surprise, the failure, or only partial success, of that “Plan A,”
is likely to leave the aggressor unprepared with a suitable “Plan B.”
Indeed, most likely it is the infeasibility of any attritional “Plan B” that
drives the choice for a “Plan A” designed to paralyse the foe’s power
of resistance and thereby register instant success.
The peril of strategic surprise is a condition of international and
national security. The danger is real, particularly for a militarily
hegemonic superpower that is acting in the role of sheriff of world
order. America’s enemies are all but obliged to seek to suspend the
dialectic of war, to quote Wirtz again. Only by seizing and keeping
the initiative, by paralyzing America’s ability to act effectively, can
materially weak enemies aspire to win. Exactly what would be won,
and for how long, are, of course, highly salient questions. As was cited
earlier, one must ask the most characteristic of strategist’s questions,
“So what?” So what that the United States might be surprised
strategically? A superpower with a global security remit cannot
anticipate or prevent surprise attacks of all kinds, in all places, at all
times. But what really would be at risk? What would be the effect of
surprise, not only upon the victim, but also upon the policy, strategy,
and behavior of the assaulted superpower?
Strategic surprise is not a metaphorical “silver bullet.” Its attempt
is more likely to prove ultimately self-defeating than to be the high
road to decisive victory. Competent, or better, armed forces are alert
to the perils of surprise attack, just as they themselves must be ready
to undertake such a task if so directed by policy. We have argued that
the problem is not surprise per se, it is the effect of surprise. And that
effect is easy to exaggerate. Our global media are in the entertainment
business. They thrive on the musings of the “threat of the month”
club. Since strategic surprises do happen, as 9/11 reminded us, and
their effects can be extremely damaging, governments and their
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armed forces are obliged to concede the reality of potential peril. The
fact that the risks and even the prospective effects of strategic surprise
are readily exaggerated, does not remove the ofﬁcial obligation to be
prepared. But, how does one prepare for surprise and its effects? It is
to this practical matter that we now must turn.
6. Minimum regrets must be a guiding principle. The Army cannot
transform itself by targeting the particulars of future strategic
surprise. Recall the mantras: the unknown is unknown, and the
impossible is impossible. Those truisms duly granted, fortunately
the strategic future is far from a closed book. Thanks primarily to the
great Prussian, we are blessed with an excellent, empirically founded,
theory of war. That theory is of universal and permanent validity
in its essentials. Clausewitz argued persuasively that “[a]ll wars are
things of the same nature.”60 So although transformation will change
some of the equipment, organization, doctrine, and generally perhaps
the military culture as a whole, though that has to be less certain, it
will not change the nature of war, at least not the “objective” nature.61
Certainly, military transformation may well alter the character of the
warfare we wage, war’s “subjective” nature as Clausewitz expressed it,
though we dare not forget the inconvenient fact that enemies will have
something to contribute to that character. However, war’s changing
character is hardly a fact of profound signiﬁcance for national security
with respect to the challenge of strategic surprise.
The proud contemporary American military establishment has
to be careful lest its commitment to a politically somewhat, indeed
necessarily, unfocused process of transformation obscures the
prospect of ﬁghting on terms that it will not prefer. The Army
recognizes this problem, and talks sensibly about adaptive adversaries
who will seek and “discover niche conventional and unconventional
capabilities.”62 It is one thing to say that in all sincerity. It is something
else again to have the mindset able to cope with the unexpected. That
is a matter of military culture. We have emphasized the inevitability
of strategic surprise, the need to recognize that the problem lies
mainly with surprise effect, and the overwhelming importance of the
geopolitical context. That context is literally unknown and unknowable,
but prudent guesswork is both necessary and feasible.
The U.S. military knows that it must be prepared for combat
with both regular and irregular enemies. Moreover, it knows also
that even future regular enemies are near certain to conduct warfare
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somewhat irregularly, asymmetrically if one prefers. They will need
to do so if they are to evade and offset America’s great strengths
in regular conventional combat. One should not make too much of
the mystery that surrounds future strategic history. For example, as
was outlined illustratively above, it is possible, even probable, that
there will be a radical change in the geopolitical context characterized
most signiﬁcantly by a return of active great-power rivalry. In that
event, China, with or without a Russian consort, is by far the leading
candidate to play the starring role in opposition to the U.S. hegemon.
Predictable capabilities support this view, as does an unsentimental
appreciation of China’s political and strategic culture. Some among us
believe that China will mature in its modernization into a contented
and generally cooperative, proﬁt-maximizing trading partner in a
U.S. policed world order. People of that opinion would do well to
ponder these words written by the eminent cultural historian, Adda
B. Bozeman:
[I]t is noteworthy that the Chinese themselves have traditionally
conceptualized the Middle Kingdom not as one bounded state in the
company of others, but as a civilization so uniquely superior that it
cannot be presumed to have frontiers. This self-view spawned China’s
insistently Sinocentric worldview; sanctioned imperial schemes of
military and political expansion; and sustained several politically and
culturally potent ideas of imperial administration, chief among them the
notion of the emperor’s “heavenly mandate” and the concept of a family
of unequal and inferior nations held together by the “Imperial Father”―
images persuasively concretized throughout the centuries by the tribute
system and the well-organized dependence on hedge-guarding satellites
and surrogates.63

The inalienable uncertainty over the timing and character of future
policy demands for their services compels the U.S. Armed Forces to
adopt an approach to their transformation best understood as one of
minimum regrets. Rephrased, it has to be the goal of defense planners
to make only minor errors in their planning. For example, one might
well come to regret having fewer batteries deployed for the purpose
of national missile defense than events demonstrate to be desirable.
However, such regret would likely be as nothing compared with the
regret one might have were the country to deploy no such missile
defense at all, and were an unsporting enemy to notice and exploit
that strategic vacancy. The great challenge in defense planning is to
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design and execute a surprise effect-tolerant military posture. The
surprise in question could take the form of an unanticipated character
of demand by U.S. foreign policy for strategic support, in addition to
unexpected unpleasantness initiated from abroad.
Success for defense planners, including those currently driving
the process of transformation, can be explained in the vernacular as
getting the big things right enough. Phrased as a blessing for such
people, we would say, “may our future regrets over your decisions
be only minor.” As a pervasive attitude, a determination to strive for
a military condition of minimum regrets helps usefully to counter
undue enthusiasm for a focus on the threat of this month or year.
7. The operational level is not the whole of war. Is the U.S. Army
pursuing the most appropriate vision in its transformation? In war
after war, the U.S. military has been surprised to learn, actually
relearn, that there is far more to war than warfare. In addition, it is
apt to forget that war is about peace, it is not a sporting event wherein
performance is measured by its own endogenous rules and metrics.
America’s professional military culture has been deeply hostile to
any blurring of the line between politician and soldier. Peace is the
business of civilians, while the waging of war is the business of
military professionals.64 There is much to commend that culture.
Unfortunately, though, the way in which the soldier approaches and
performs his expert military duty can, indeed almost invariably must,
have profound political implications. In practice the realms of policy
and warfare inﬂuence each other continuously, even in areas that
appear to be strictly political or strictly military. The outcome to World
War I, and the manner of its termination by an armistice (contrary
to General Pershing’s preference, we must add), taught a valuable
lesson about the connection between the waging and conclusion
of war, and the provision of political fuel for a follow-on event.65
The U.S. part in the defeat of Germany in World War II revealed to
many people the umbilical tie between the conduct of war and the
character of the succeeding peace and international order. For at least
the last 18 months of the war, Stalin was ﬁghting more for the peace
settlement that he wanted than for the most efﬁcient demise of German
military power. The United States, in contrast, was ﬁghting almost
strictly with reference to the course of the war. Moreover, America’s
impatience to transfer all its military effort to the war in the Paciﬁc was
decidedly unhelpful in its conduct of the closing phases of the war in
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Europe. Over Korea, the United States learned that its enemies were
conducting grand strategy, not military strategy. The Chinese fought
and negotiated seamlessly. Mao-Tse tung, we know, was an admiring
student of Clausewitz.66 The core of my residual uneasiness about the
current process of U.S. military transformation, despite the admirable
sentiments expressed in its guiding documents, lies in these words by
the Prussian:
Once again: war is an instrument of policy. It must necessarily bear the
character of policy and measure by its standards. The conduct of war, in
its great outline, is therefore policy itself, which takes up the sword in
place of the pen, but does not on that account cease to think according to
its own laws.67

To continue the history lesson, in Vietnam the Military Advisory
Command Vietnam (MACV), though admittedly not the Marines,
waged the war ineffectively in at least two major respects. The nature
of the conﬂict was misunderstood, with the result that a military
solution was sought to what, fundamentally, was a political challenge
that could be met effectively only by local indigenous effort. As if that
were not damaging enough, even the military dimension of the war
was conducted in good part inappropriately, because MACV did not
comprehend, let alone favor, counterinsurgency, and in particular
failed to give ﬁrst priority to the provision of security to the bulk of
the population.68
More recently, the two wars against Iraq again revealed repeatedly
that American military prowess was not cashed at close to its full value
in political returns. This was unfortunate because those anticipated
returns were, after all, what the ﬁghting was all about. It may seem
that these critical observations are unfair. One might object on the
grounds that: I exaggerate the extent of the divorce between U.S.
military strategy and operations and U.S. policy; and that I lay fault
on the Armed Forces, when, if fault there be, it lies principally with
civilian policymakers. In reply, I would deny exaggeration, but agree
that the ultimate responsibility for the American way of war and its
performance as an instrument of policy certainly rests with civilians
rather than soldiers.69
The concluding argument of this monograph, the one that binds
together all that has gone before, is that there has been, and remains,
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all too consistently, a principal weakness in the American approach to
war and peace. That weakness is a failure to regard and employ force
as political behavior for political purposes, which is to say for policy.
Time after time, the American problem with the permanent condition
of possible strategic surprise has stemmed from unpreparedness for
the political consequences of military action. The American practical
divorce of military and political behaviors creates a vulnerability
to being surprised by the actions of enemies and allies who do not
maintain that separation. In addition, the political consequences of
American military action frequently have been unanticipated.
The argument here is not a criticism of the contemporary process
of military transformation. On the contrary, it is supportive and
complementary. But it does reﬂect the judgment that the planned
transformation needs to be conducted with even greater awareness
than is evidenced already of the indissoluble connection between
military behavior and political consequences. The U.S. Armed Forces
today are committed to a long-term process of cumulatively radical
change which should enable them to be even more proﬁcient in the
waging of a style of high technology warfare in which they are already
the world leader by a country mile and more. In addition, American
forces should be more capable of meeting irregular foes on appropriate
terms. There is no denying that, in common with the German Army in
both world wars and the Israeli Defense Forces since, the U.S. Army
today and tomorrow is most adept both tactically and especially in
the conduct of deadly joint warfare by superior operational skills. All
of which is highly praiseworthy, at least up to a point. The history
of German, Israeli, and American operational dexterity reveals,
however, admittedly what everybody knows, that there is a lot more
to war than the operational level. Undoubtedly the Germans were
proﬁcient at operations, just as today the U.S. Armed Forces are lethal
with their operational skill in decisive maneuver facilitated by precise
ﬁrepower, delivered largely from the air.70 But why it is that all three
countries have had monumental difﬁculties functioning competently
at the strategic and grand strategic levels of war? Of course, one can
argue that the current transformation, with its goal of providing truly
agile and adaptable forces for all contingencies, should make a large
difference for the better in the ﬁt of American military power with
the demands of policy. However, a little reﬂection raises the thought
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that the transformation may not really reach the principal zone of U.S.
weakness, which is the no-man’s land of strategy that has to connect
the political to the military.
The evidence provided by U.S. experience in and after recent wars
suggests strongly that the process of military transformation, though
desirable in itself, focuses attention on a relatively minor problem,
while leaving the major challenge unaddressed and perhaps even
unrecognized. Through transformation, the Army, for example, should
improve its ability to defeat both regular and, hopefully, irregular
enemies. Those who believe that much of the Army can become
SF-like in response to a changing strategic context are, alas, fooling
themselves. Not only must the Army remain capable of defeating
any and every regular foe in heavy combat, it also has growing need
of SF truly worthy of the name. Immature young soldiers are not
appropriate SF material. At least they are not for so long as the SF are
not so expanded, coopted, and eventually melded into the rest of the
Army that they lose much of their distinctive quality.71
By all means, let the Armed Forces innovate and improve their
ﬁghting power. That is not at issue. I am in full agreement with the
writer for The Economist who observed recently that, “[s]uccess in
battle, according to one military maxim, may not, on its own, assure
the achievement of national security goals, but defeat will guarantee
failure.”72 What is at issue is whether the process of transformation
is in danger of fostering a military culture that values military skills,
especially combat skills, almost for their own sake. For once, history
reveals a clear lesson to those Americans willing to learn. It tries to tell
us that by far the most serious inhibitor of U.S. strategic effectiveness
is a seemingly systemic difﬁculty in employing military force in ways
that promote the chosen political goals. The strategic surprises that
have ambushed U.S. national security performance overwhelmingly
have been political, not military, in kind. Military transformation is
close to irrelevant to the real problem that persistently constrains the
value of U.S. strategic prowess.
*****
War is about peace. Peacetime preparation is about being able to
conduct the wars that might erupt in a manner that serves political
ends, or, more valuable still, it is about deterrence. To repeat the
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familiar refrain, there is more to war than warfare. Above all else,
war is about the kind of peace that should follow. As a consequence,
war needs to be waged in a way that does not compromise political
interests. Recognition of the importance of these elements of the lore
of war and peace is the high road to achieving a marked reduction
in the incidence and severity of unpleasant strategic surprise. Of
course, there is everything to be said in favor of a U.S. Army that can
transform itself into becoming all that it can be. Would that that were
the primary challenge. Unfortunately it is not, as this monograph has
sought to argue.
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